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Abstract 
Securing valuable information assets is a problem that cuts across multiple industries and organizational 
missions.  Using a database-driven approach to risk assessment, we developed a database model based on 
prior conceptual work in information security.  Our approach is novel in that, as a risk assessment model, 
it emphasizes harnessing the advantages of a relational database approach to improve the efficiency and 
scope of risk assessment.  Our method was proof of concept.  We illustrated the database model’s use, 
implementing it within a single domain—healthcare—and applied it to a single hypothetical scenario.   
The result was that the implemented database produced a resultant list of threats and countermeasures 
for the given health security scenario.  Future work includes testing the approach with clients across 
multiple domains.  The work has the potential to provide valuable risk-related, cross-domain benefits. 
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Introduction 
Information systems are widely used to support organizational missions and goals across industries, and 
are increasingly understood to be valuable assets requiring protection. With information systems (IS) 
impacting wide ranging industry domains, including banking, insurance, finance, manufacturing, 
automotive, telecommunications, government, and healthcare, information security should be seen as a 
common problem with industry and organization-specific aspects. Organizational information security 
management includes putting security controls in place to protect IS assets from financial loss, resource 
overutilization, legal liability, loss of reputation, and penalties (Guttman and Roback 1995).  Effective 
selection and management of security controls to counter current and future threats is a critical to long-
term organizational success.   
Risk assessment plays an important role in the proper selection of security controls. Risk assessment as 
defined here involves identification of threats, vulnerabilities and assets and estimation of relative 
riskiness. Risk assessments also “delineate both the strategy to reduce the likelihood of a risk occurring 
(preventative measures) as well as the measures to respond effectively if  a risk becomes a direct threat 
(reactive measures)” (Schou and Shoemaker 2007). Risk can be defined as the overall possible 
undesirable outcome due to deliberate or accidental exploitation of a vulnerability considering both the 
likelihood and the impact of the event.  A vulnerability can be defined as a “flaw or weakness in system 
security procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that could be exploited to accomplish a 
security breach or a violation of the system’s security policy” (Stoneburner et al. 2002).  A threat is a 
potential exploitation of a vulnerability by a threat-source against a threat asset. The combination of 
threat-asset and vulnerability constitute a unique threat action (Stoneburner et al. 2002). One approach 
to conducting risk assessment is to rank-order all the threats from most risky to least risky. The threat list 
facilitates risk assessment and risk management (Pardue 2009).  
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Our risk assessment model is based on relational database technology. Our approach posits it is possible 
to design a generic threat-database schema a priori and use it to derive a threat list  specific to a given risk 
environment, and to perform risk assessment based on the derived threat list.  A major advantage of this 
approach is that the database will evolve with each subsequent risk assessment. The database will refine 
and accumulate the collective knowledge and wisdom of the risk analysts. Furthermore, we submit that 
the model is applicable to a wide range of security domains, such as healthcare, voting, banking, 
insurance, etc.).  
The purpose of this paper is to describe a database-driven model for risk assessment and to demonstrate 
the feasibility of this model.  The next sections will provide a complete description of the model’s database 
structure.  The model will then be described as having three attributes: robustness to risk-related 
differences across industry domains, completeness from a priori entry of threat data, and adaptability for 
analyzing an evolving risk landscape.  A proof of concept of its feasibility, using a healthcare threat 
domain scenario, follows.  The proof of concept will demonstrate that it is possible to implement our 
conceptual data model, populate it with data, and produce results. A more complete description of our 
risk assessment process and its validation is beyond the scope of this work-in-progress paper.  We 
conclude with a discussion of the future directions of this ongoing work. 
Generic Threat Database  
The threat database presented in this paper is based on relational technology. In the relational model, 
data are organized into tables (also known as relations), with rows and columns. A relation is an 
abstraction of a person, place, thing, event, or concept. It is this power of abstraction that enables the 
model to be applied to a wide range of domains.  The structure of the database design abstracts and 
categorizes essential risk features of the risk assessment process. We used an entity relationship diagram 
(ERD) to logically represent these abstractions, or entities, and the relationships between and among 
entities.  The database design reduces cognitive complexity while leveraging query technologies to reduce 
the complexity of the risk assessment search space. Namely, the risk analyst need only assess the threats 
produced by a query against the database. See section later in this paper for a description of query 
capabilities. 
The beginning point for construction of the database design was identification of essential elements for 
information security risk assessment.  These elements, which comprise the entities or relations, of the 
database model are THREAT, ASSET, VULNERABILITY, and CONTROL. These essential elements were 
derived from prior work (Hoffman et al. 1978, Whitman 2003). Hoffman et al.’s SECURATE paper was an 
early theoretical description of essential security entities.  They described security threats, objects 
(assets), and features (controls), defining a security system as a set of objects, each with a loss value; a set 
of threats, each with a likelihood, and a set of features, each with a resistance.  Whitman advocated 
performing risk assessment by prioritizing threats and assets along axis of a grid.  Starting with the upper 
left corner cell that matched the highest order threat- asset pairing at an intersecting cell, the risk analyst 
would consider whether that pairing represented an exposure of a particular asset to a specific threat—in 
other words, a vulnerability. The analyst would then document one or more controls selected in each cell 
for each threat-asset pair with an identified vulnerability.  Thus, T-V-A analysis became a simplistic form 
of vulnerability assessment. This triad, perhaps better named for our purposes as a T-V-A-C quadruple, 
forms the core structure for the entire database design.  See Figure 1.  
 Short Title up to 8 words 
  
 Twentieth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Savannah, 2014 3 
 
Figure 1. Entity-Relationship Diagram of Threat Model 
 
In addition to T, V, A, and C, our model includes two other entities, THREAT SOURCE, CAUSE, and 
DOMAIN. These abstractions are derived from our definition of a threat as the potential exploitation of a 
vulnerability by a threat source against an asset through either deliberate or situational causation. Threats 
can be countered by security controls. Threats are realized in a specific domain such as healthcare, 
banking, or financial services.  
The following section describes each abstraction, shown in the ERD in Figure 1, separately. 
Threat  
A threat is either an exploitation or accidental triggering of a vulnerability by a threat source against an 
asset. In the ERD, we model the event or circumstance that can result in adverse impact on an 
organization as the entity “THREAT”.  
Similar to threat sources, threats should be defined in terms that are specific to a domain but generic in 
form. Ideally, a threat should be written as a verb expression. For example, in the healthcare domain, 
threats to data can be generically defined in terms of verbs such as disclose, delete, manipulate, and gain 
unauthorized access to patient health information.  
A threat source either intentionally exploits or accidentally triggers a vulnerability against an asset 
through intent/situation and method that brings about the threat action. A threat can be executed in 
many ways. Each high-level threat, for example, “disclose critical data or information” or “manipulate 
critical data or information”, can be executed through a number of different methods. Each method or 
action that brings about adverse impact is termed a “threat action.” To the degree possible, the instances 
of threat action should be specific to the threat domain but generic in form. Example threat actions would 
be “inject malware into EHR system” or “inject SQL expression into login text for EHR system.” Specific 
malware or SQL injection attacks need not be enumerated. Both threat actions can lead to the threat 
“disclose critical data or information.” 
Vulnerability  
Vulnerability is another essential component in the threat-vulnerability-asset-control quadruple. 
According to NIST 800-30, a vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, 
implementation, or internal controls that could be exercised (accidentally triggered or intentionally 
exploited) and result in a security breach or a violation of the system’s security policy (Stoneburner et al. 
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2002). In our database model, a weakness in a system security procedure, design, implementation, or 
control is modeled as the entity “VULNERABILITY.” Some examples of vulnerabilities are weak antivirus 
software, poor input validation technique, and computer screens exposed to others.  A single threat may 
be able to exercise more than one vulnerability in a system, and vice-versa. Thus, our design depicts a 
many-to-many relationship between the entities “THREAT” and “VULNERABILITY.” 
Asset 
Threats to a system are carried out against assets within an organization that result in adverse impact. In 
general, assets include data, images, all types of hardware, software, and networks found in the domain of 
the security environment, and also people and procedures. This collection of components is modeled by 
the entity “ASSET.”  Assets should be stated as generic types such as wireless routers, desktop computers, 
or ftp clients rather than vendor specific assets. In the healthcare domain, examples of assets could be a 
patient’s electronic health record or a patient’s MRI.   
The exploitation/triggering of a vulnerability will likely target a combination of assets. For example, in the 
healthcare domain, a threat source may execute a SQL injection attack by exploiting a vulnerability 
associated with an electronic health record exposed through a web browser CPOE (Computerized 
Physician Order Entry). Therefore, the entity “ASSET” is linked to the entity “THREAT” through a many-
to- many relationship. 
Control 
No security environment can be risk free. The best an organization can do is implement controls that 
mitigate the risk of a threat to an acceptable level. Controls are employed as countermeasures designed to 
restrict, monitor, and protect assets against a threat, thereby minimizing the possibility of a threat 
exercising vulnerability (Stoneburner et al. 2002). Some examples of controls are strong security software 
integrated anti-virus, anti-spyware, firewall, anti-spam, anti-phishing, backup technologies, intrusion 
prevention (IPS), and sheltered computer screen.  
The control or countermeasures are modeled as the entity “CONTROL” in the ERD. Controls or counter 
measures are intended to counter actions taken by a potential threat source. A control can counter one or 
more threat actions. For example, a firewall can prevent threat actions such as unauthorized access, 
gateway defense, hiding and protecting internal network addresses.  Likewise, a threat action can be 
countered by one or more controls. For example a SQL injection attack can be countered by both intrusion 
prevention and a firewall. The many-to-many relationship exists between the entity “CONTROL” and the 
entity “THREAT.” 
Threat Source 
A threat is a potential exercise of a vulnerability by a threat source against an asset. In the ERD, we model 
the agent who either deliberately or accidently exercises a vulnerability as the entity “THREAT SOURCE”. 
The entity THREAT SOURCE is a classification of threat sources rather than specific instances of threat 
sources. Sample threat sources could be “human-unintentional insider”, “human-deliberate insider”, or 
“human-deliberate outsider” rather than specific instances such as “bank clerk”, “claims adjuster”, or 
“physician”. The generic classification of threat sources provides guidance for identifying specific threat 
sources in a particular risk environment during the risk assessment and planning process. Attempts to 
encode all possible instances of threat sources negate the power of abstraction gained by the use of a 
database model.  Details for a specific threatsource are given in the scenario attribute as an example. 
Cause 
The Cause entity models the motivational and situational factors associated with threat sources, 
recognizing that threat sources are both human and non-human, and both deliberate and unintentional in 
the case of human sources. A vulnerability, therefore, may be intentionally exploited or accidentally 
triggered.  Deliberate causes assume a rational man model for threat sources, meaning an attacker will act 
as a threat source against an asset to accomplish a specific goal. All things being equal, a deliberate threat 
source will strive to maximize the impact of exploiting a vulnerability while minimizing the cost of 
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carrying out the threat action. Examples of costs are money, time, expertise required to attain needed 
skills, and the risk of detection (Jones 2005). Human-unintentional threat sources include people making 
mistakes, and non-human causes include technical, natural and environmental causes.  Therefore, in 
conducting a risk assessment and planning for risk management, it is important to document the cause of 
a threat. Understanding the cause of a threat aids in deciding which of many possible controls to 
implement. Causes should be described in terms of high level outcomes. For example, in the healthcare 
domain, a deliberate threat source could carry out a threat action for a threat for “economic gain” 
(blackmail, unauthorized benefits) or “non-economic gain” (revenge, curiosity) or both, while human-
unintentional sources might bring about threat actions due to stress, fatigue, or poor training. Technical, 
environmental and natural causes of threats might include software defects, power outages and weather 
disasters.   
Threat sources determine threat actions through causation.  A threat source can result in a threat action 
that may be associated with multiple causes. In like measure, a cause can provide the impetus for multiple 
threats. Therefore, the relationship between the entity THREAT and the entity CAUSE is modeled as 
many-to-many. 
Domain 
Finally, we posit that the database design presented here is sufficiently abstracted to be applicable to a 
wide range of domains. The entity “DOMAIN” models the context for the security environment. In this 
paper, the healthcare domain is used to illustrate our database-driven risk assessment model. However, 
our database driven model is applicable to other domains as well.  
After describing different entities in the ERD, the following section explains our database based risk 
assessment model. 
Database-driven Risk Assessment Model  
The Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD) depicted in Figure 1 is a logical model of all the entities and the 
relationships between the entities in the risk assessment process: THREAT, VULNERABILITY, ASSET, 
CONTROL, THREAT SOURCE, CAUSE, and DOMAIN.  Given this data model and the relationships 
therein,  
we propose to construct a database of threats and populate all the tables with wide-ranging 
threat data for each domain, a priori. We can then use this generic database such that given a 
set of assets, vulnerabilities, and controls, a risk analyst can derive a set of threats appropriate 
to a given security context by querying the database.  
This is our database-driven risk assessment model that states that we can derive a threat list specific to a 
security context from the generic threat database constructed ahead of the time.   
The ERD is our logical model used to drive the implementation of the physical database used for risk 
assessment. The following section briefly describes how we implemented the database from the ERD. 
Database Schema  
The ERD in Figure 1 is implemented as a database schema depicted in Figure 2. To construct database 
schema, the conceptual model (ERD) is transformed into an equivalent set of related normalized tables 
(also known as relations).  A normalized or a well-structured relation is defined as a relation that contains 
minimum data redundancy and allows users to perform data manipulation operations without data 
inconsistencies.   
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Figure 2. Database Schema 
 
The other important element of the ERD to database schema transformation is to resolve many-to-many 
(M:N) relationships between the entities. The M:N relationships between two entities are resolved by 
creating a separate relation. The new relation created is an associative table. The primary key of the new 
associative table is combination of attributes that take their values from primary keys of the original 
entities in the M:N relationship. 
The rest of the section will describe the tables equivalent to the entities in the ERD, and also will discuss 
all the associative tables introduced to resolve M:N relationships between the entities in the ERD. 
Tables in the Database Schema  
The entities THREAT, VULNERABILITY, ASSET, CONTROL, THREAT SOURCE, CAUSE, and DOMAIN 
are implemented by the tables “tblThreat”, “tblVulnerability”, etc. This many-to-many relationship 
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between the table “tblThreat” and the table “tblCause” is resolved by the associative table 
“tblThreatMotivation”.  The one-to-many relationship that exists between the tables “tblThreat” and 
“tblThreatAction,” is modeled with the foreign key “ThreatID” in the table “tblThreatAction.”  The many-
to-many relationship between the tables “tblAsset” and “tblVulnerability” is resolved through the 
associative table “tblAssetVulnerability.” The many-to-many relationship between control and asset is 
resolved through the table “tblAssetControl.” The many-to-many relationship between the tables 
“tblAsset” and “tblThreatSource” is resolved with the table “tblAssetThreatSource.” Finally, the many-to-
many relationships among the tables tblThreatAction, tblVulnerability, tblControl, tblThreatSource, and 
tblDomain are resolved through the table “tblThreatIntegration.” The table “tblThreatIntegration” 
documents a single combination of threat action, vulnerability, threat source, and control. 
The following section briefly describes how we developed the healthcare domain threat database. 
Populating the Threat Database 
We populated our database with threat data for the healthcare domain in a two-phase process. The first 
phase in constructing a domain specific threat database is cataloging Threat-Vulnerability-Asset (TVA) 
triads, using Whitman’s model.  The TVA cataloging involves threat and asset identification, and 
vulnerability analysis.  In phase two, we extended TVA triads to include related causes, threat sources, 
threat actions, and controls.  The result was essentially a threat matrix, each row of which includes the 
seven attributes plus a threat scenario that illustrates an actual or hypothetical instance of the threat. For 
each TVA triad cataloged in the first step, we identified and listed all the associated causes, threat sources, 
threat actions, and controls.  
We identified and listed TVA triads and extended the triads based on a literature review, previous work of 
the authors and other sources.  The specific sources used to create the threat matrix include: literature 
(Stoneburner et al. 2002, Kahn et al. 2008, Samy et al. 2010, Nematzadeh et al. 201, Kotz et al. 2011), 
previous work of the authors (Landry et al. 2011, Pardue et al. 2011) and careful understanding the threat 
domains through field studies, attending conferences on security and privacy, the NIST Computer 
Security Resource  Center (csrc.nist.gov), and expert knowledge.   
A row in the threat matrix is transposed and replicated in Table 1. Each row in the threat matrix 
corresponds to one row in the table “tblThreatIntegration.” We populated tables “tblCause,” 
“tblThreatSource,” “tblThreat,”  “tblThreatAction,” “tblVulnerability,” “tblControl,” and “tblAsset” with 
distinct values of the attributes of the threat matrix Cause, Threat Source, Threat, Threat Action, 
Vulnerability, Control, and Asset, respectively.  
The table “tblThreatIntegration” attributes take their values from primary keys of the “tblThreatSource,” 
“tblThreatAction,” “tblVulnerability,” “tblControl,” and “tblDomain.”   
Healthcare TVA matrix and Scenario  
The table below describes a hypothetical threat scenario. 
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Threat Attribute Value 
Cause Non-economic gain – revenge – blackmail 
Threat Source Human-deliberate insider 
Threat Action Disclose health information by extracting data 
through USB drive/CD. 
Asset Patient health records, patient personal 
identification information 
Vulnerability Accessible removable media ports 
Controls Disable removable media ports.  
If ports are enabled the computer system must 
be in secure area with authorized entry. Strong 
antivirus and malware protection. 
Threat Scenario(s) Threat scenario: human-deliberate insider - In 
this scenario, the threat-source is a nurse 
seeking revenge post-termination. The nurse 
has insider knowledge that the removable 
media ports (USB/ CD) on computers are 
enabled in the hospital facility and systems in 
which critical information about patients are 
stored. He visits the hospital under the 
pretense of retrieving personal items left 
behind but actually seeks revenge by disclosing 
patient information in order to damage the 
hospital’s reputation and create legal exposure.  
 
While momentarily left alone in a triage area, 
the former nurse inserts a USB flash drive into 
an accessible computer and extracts patient 
health records. 
Table 1. Health Care Threat Profile 
Proof of Concept 
The fundamental premise of the database-driven methodology presented here is that it is possible to 
construct a generic relational database for the risk assessment process and populate the database with T-
V-A-C risk data for different threat domains. To conduct risk assessment for a client with this database 
model, we would identify assets, vulnerabilities and controls in the client’s current security context. A 
query against the threat database would result in a list of threats specific to the client.  
Although many approaches to assessing risk exist, the approach proposed here is to produce a rank-
ordered list of threats (Pardue et al. 2009). Rank-ordering allows the analyst to estimate the relative 
riskiness of a threat, conduct what-if analysis, estimate residual risk, and prioritize resource allocations 
for implementing controls. The ability to rank risks in our database is a work-in-progress.  When this 
capability becomes available and a suitable client is identified, further validation of our risk assessment 
method will be possible. For now, we will demonstrate the concept of our risk assessment model by 
illustrating with a hypothetical scenario.  See the healthcare scenario profiled in Table 1.  
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Asset, Vulnerability and Control Identification 
An analysis of the existing security state of the hypothetical health care facility depicted in Table 1 was 
conducted to identify assets, vulnerabilities and controls. The following list represents a subset of the 
assets identified. 
• Personal computer unit (laptop, desktop) 
• Application servers, database server, files, hard-drives, hubs, servers 
• Patient health records 
• Patient identity information 
• Operating system 
• Routers 
• Smart phones/ devices 
The following vulnerabilities were identified. 
• Accessible removable media ports 
• Computer screens exposed to other patients, insider and outsiders 
• Unattended computers 
• Unlocked screens 
 
The following controls were in place. 
 
• Anti-Sniffing Tools, Antivirus protection, Security patches 
• Authentication by swiping thumb 
• Regular file back-up 
• Employee education to be careful when engaging in peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing (Avoid 
downloading files with the extensions .exe, .scr, .lnk, .bat, .vbs, .dll, .bin, and .cmd) 
• Employee education to be certain a web site is legitimate before you go there 
• Monitoring database traffic and compares it to expectations 
• Doctors uniform 
• Download the latest version of browsers 
• Educating medical staff about severity, consequences, fines and penalties related to data breach 
• Employee photoID badges and wrist bands 
• Enable automatic Windows® updates 
• Encrpyted data, Firewall enabled, IAR (Internet Alert Registry) 
• Implementing the principle of least privilege 
• Intrusion prevention systems (IPS) by inspecting database traffic 
• Managed by suitable security architectures, Multilevel authentication - Strong Password 
• No cameras allowed within premises 
• No open LCD display of patient information, Packet filtering 
• PatientID is used wherever necessary,  Hijack alert system,  Query-level access control 
• Network protocols and services that do not rely on the IP source address for authentication 
• Routing Intelligence, Sheltered or private registration desk and triage room  
• Software updates, Strong authentication mechanisms, Strong encryption key 
• Strong mutual authentication 
• Strong security software  integrated anti-virus, anti-spyware, firewall, anti-spam, anti-phishing, 
and backup technologies 
• Switched networks,  Use encrypted Wi-Fi wireless access point 
• Use extreme caution when opening attachments 
• Use security precautions for your PDA, cell phone, and Wi-Fi devices 
• Use Internet service provider (ISP) that implements strong anti-spam and anti-phishing 
procedures 
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• Written warnings 
With the assets, threat sources, vulnerabilities and controls identified for the threat scenario, we 
constructed an SQL query and derived a threat list relevant to the hypothetical security context under 
examination.   
Query Structure and Result  
The query technology used with our methodology is Structure Query Language (SQL). SQL is used to 
access and manipulate relational data. The major data operations are Create, Read, Update and Delete 
(CRUD).  CRUD operations are executed against the database to maintain and modify threat data and to 
produce threat lists for risk assessment based on inputs from risk analysts. The actual query used to 
produce a list of threats was very complex. A stylized, generic version is provided below to illustrate the 
basic query structure. 
SELECT tblThreat.Threat, tblThreatAction.ThreatAction --other attributes… 
FROM   tblThreatIntegration, tblThreat, tblThreatAction, tblAsset,   
  tblVulnerability, tblThreatSource --other tables 
WHERE  tblThreatIntegration.ThreatID=tblThreat.ThreatID AND 
  tblThreatIntegration.ThreatActionID=tblThreatAction.ThreatActionID AND 
  --other PK=FK comparisons AND 
  AssetID IN(list of FKs) AND 
  VulnerabilityID IN(list of FKs) AND 
  ThreatActionID NOT IN (SELECT ThreatActionID  
          FROM tblControl 
           WHERE ControlID IN (list of FKs)) 
 
The list of threats and threat actions returned by the query for the hypothetical scenario are reproduced 
below in Figure 3. The column “Threat” contains duplicate data values because Threat has a 1:m 
relationship with ThreatAction, that is, there are multiple possible threat actions to execute a given threat. 
 
 
Table 3. Query Result – a Threat List 
A second query was run to identify controls or counter measures the client should consider to mitigate 
their exposure to these threats. The controls identified were: 
• Disable removable media ports 
• If ports are enabled the computer system must be in secure area 
• Automatic screen lock 
• Burglar alarm and cameras in storage area 
• Sheltered computer screen 
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The hypothetical illustration served as a proof of concept for our database-driven risk assessment model.  
It illustrated the conceptual data model’s implementation as a database schema, and the population of 
that database with (healthcare) domain-specific T-V-A-C risk data.   Further evidence demonstrated that 
the database could be queried to produce relevant risk assessment results.  Two types of results were 
reported:  a threat list, and possible controls to counter the unmitigated threats.  As a proof of concept, 
this illustration demonstrated, therefore, that our database, in prototype form, is capable of being used. 
With the addition of the capabilities for estimating risk, and when tested with clients, our work will be 
more suitably validated, and a contribution to the practice of risk assessment is possible.  
Future Work 
In this paper we purposed a database driven risk assessment model. We demonstrated our risk 
assessment model by generating a threat list based on a hypothetical hospital scenario. Future research 
will involve an actual case study of a health care facility and generation of a threat list and risk assessment 
report.  
The research can be extended to development of a Web-based risk assessment application. The software 
application would enable a client to enter data on their assets, vulnerabilities, and controls. The resulting 
list of threats and additional controls would provide the basis for a risk assessment plan and reports.  
We plan to expand our database with threat data in other domains, such as banking, e-commerce, 
insurance, manufacturing, and voting. The threat database will evolve with each subsequent risk 
assessment study. In this way, the database will refine and accumulate the collective knowledge and 
expertise of risk analysts. Intelligence can be added to the database functionality through the development 
and implementation of data mining and machine learning algorithms. The knowledge discovered in one 
domain could be applied to other domains and also to perform predictive analysis of the threats for 
clients.   
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